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THE BENEFITS OF THE DEMOCRACY CANON  
AND THE VIRTUES OF SIMPLICITY:  
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR ELMENDORF 




In a recent Article,1 I describe and defend a longstanding substantive 
canon of statutory interpretation, which I dub “the Democracy Canon.”2 The 
Canon calls upon courts to liberally construe election statutes under certain 
circumstances so as to favor enfranchisement of the voter and to maximize voter 
choice.  For example, a court applying the Canon could order election officials to 
count a vote cast by a voter who used a check mark rather than a statutorily-
mandated “x” to indicate the voter’s choice.3 The Canon instructs that a voter’s 
minor technical deviations from statutory requirements (or an election official’s 
failure to follow statutory procedures) ordinarily should not lead to voter 
disenfranchisement. 
Though the name “Democracy Canon” is new, the Canon itself has a long 
and distinguished pedigree.  Indeed, I traced its origin back to at least 1885, when 
the Supreme Court of Texas recognized that “[a]ll statutes tending to limit the 
citizen in the exercise of [the right of suffrage] should be liberally construed in his 
favor.”4  Since then, it has been applied in myriad state courts, by judges of all 
political and ideological stripes, to deal with a wide variety of election 
administration issues.5  Many state legislatures have seen fit to codify the Canon, 
providing for liberal construction of various election administration statutes.6  For 
reasons explained in my Article and revisited below, I believe the Canon is a 
sound one and that its use should be extended to federal courts.7 At the very least, 
                                                                                                    
* William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  Thanks 
to Chris Elmendorf, Ethan Leib, Luke McLoughlin and Dan Tokaji for useful comments and 
suggestions. 
1 Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69 (2009). 
2 A substantive canon is a rule of statutory interpretation based in policy.  Such canons “reflect 
judicially-based policy concerns, grounded in the courts’ understanding of how to treat statutory 
text with reference to judicially perceived constitutional priorities, pre-enactment common law 
practices, or specific statutorily based policies.”  James J. Brudney & Corey Dislear, Canons of 
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13 (2005). 
3 Hasen, supra note 1, at 84-85 (describing Fallon v. Dwyer, 90 N.E. 942 (N.Y. 1910). 
4 Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett, 64 Tex. 500, 1885 WL 7221, at *7 (1885). 
5 Hasen, supra note 1, at 83-86. 
6 Id. at 79 n.49. 
7 Id. Pts. II, III. 
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federal courts should not find constitutional problems when a state court, which 
has relied upon the Canon consistently in the past, applies it to resolve a pending 
election dispute.8 
In this issue of the Cornell Law Review, Professor Christopher S. 
Elmendorf provides a thoughtful and detailed Response to my Article.9 
Sandwiched between praise for my Article at the beginning and end of his 
Response,10 however, is a sustained attack on my argument for the Democracy 
Canon.   Professor Elmendorf worries that the Canon “could provide a varnish of 
legality for far-fetched interpretations of the federal election statutes.”11  He states 
that my arguments in defense of the Canon “are so tenuous that one wonders 
whether” they are the true reasons I defend the Canon.  He argues the Canon 
cannot be defended on “good results” grounds because election law cases always 
involve tradeoffs among competing values.12 He says that the Canon will 
exacerbate tension in the judiciary, leading to more partisan judicial 
decisionmaking.13 He also suggests that application of the Canon on the federal 
level is likely to lead to less bipartisan election legislation in Congress.14 The best 
he can say about the Canon is that (continued) court application of it would not be 
“disastrous.”15   
Professor Elmendorf then spends more than half of his Response offering 
three alternative canons of interpretation in statutory election law cases which he 
claims are “more normatively defensible and less politically treacherous” than the 
Democracy Canon.16 Professor Elmendorf concedes that his leading alternative 
proposed canon, the Effective Accountability Canon (the EA Canon), has not 
been adopted by any court and has been rejected repeatedly by the Supreme Court 
in its constitutional variant.17 Grounding the EA Canon in a number of 
constitutional provisions, most importantly the Guarantee Clause, Professor 
Elmendorf advocates use of the EA Canon to interpret statutes to (1) insure that 
the voting public is representative of the group of people entitled to vote; (2) 
improve the aggregate competence of the voting public to make decisions about 
which candidates retrospectively and prospectively act in the voters’ interest; and 
                                                                                                    
8 Id., Pt. IV. In his Response to my Article, Professor Elmendorf does not comment upon this 
aspect of my Article, which I consider to be among its most important points. 
9 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010).  Professor Elmendorf’s Response is almost as long as my original Article. 
10 Id. at ___ [3] (calling Article “important”); id. at ___ [49] (calling Article “terrific”). 
11 Id. at ___ [4]. 
12 Id. at ___ [5]. 
13 Id. at ___ [6]. 
14 Id. at ___ [13-14]. 
15 Id. at ___ [16]. 
16 Id. at ___ [4]. 
17 Id. at ___ [34-35]. 
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(3) facilitate coordination among like-minded voters.  If accepted by courts, the 
EA Canon could be used interpret ambiguous statutes to attack everything from 
the timing of elections to the drawing of electoral districts, to the existence of 
nonpartisan elections, and much more.18 
There is an ethereal feel to Professor Elmendorf’s Response.  He would 
throw out an accepted tool of statutory interpretation that has been used since 
1885 in many states by judges of varied political persuasions in favor of a 
convoluted, complex alternative that has never been accepted by any court, that 
would be more disruptive of the political system than the Democracy Canon has 
been, and that would be more prone to partisan manipulation than the Democracy 
Canon. In short, Professor Elmendorf would replace tradition and simplicity with 
ivory tower complexity, and replace a canon with a proven track record with one 
that courts would struggle to understand, much less apply. 
This brief Reply makes three principal points.  First, the Democracy 
Canon is eminently defensible on normative grounds as protecting voters’ rights.  
It does not suffer from the defects Professor Elmendorf describes.  Importantly it 
has not exacerbated partisan tensions among the judiciary; to the contrary, the 
Canon can serve to diffuse partisan tension.  Professor Elmendorf confuses the 
“access versus integrity” debate, which breaks down along Democrat-Republican 
lines, with application of the Democracy Canon, which does not. 
Second, extension of the Democracy Canon to federal courts is unlikely to 
change the nature of Congressional dealmaking in the election administration 
arena. Congressional Republicans are unlikely to avoid passing election law 
legislation that might be subject to the Canon because the Canon could be just as 
advantageous to presumed Republican interests as to Democratic interests; 
imagine, for example, judicial application of the Canon to a statute governing the 
counting of military overseas ballots.  Likely the possibility of the Canon’s 
deployment by the federal judiciary would have no effect on Congressional 
dealmaking.  
Third, courts are more likely to accept proposals for rules governing the 
judicial role in resolving election law disputes if the proposals are simple and 
grounded in historical practice and political reality.  For this reason, the 
Democracy Canon shows far more promise than the EA Canon in structuring 
judicial review of election law statutes.  Far from being near-“disastrous,” the 




                                                                                                    
18 Id. at ___ [36-38] (footnotes omitted). 
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DEFENDING THE DEMOCRACY CANON 
 
Part II of my Article provides a detailed defense of the Democracy Canon 
as a tool of statutory interpretation, and Part III deals with the most significant 
objection to its application: a worry about the role the Canon could play in further 
politicizing the judiciary, which has already shown itself politicized over certain 
election law disputes. I do not repeat that extensive defense in this Reply.  
Instead, in this Part I respond to Professor Elmendorf’s three main criticisms of 
the use of the Democracy Canon.  First, he claims that the Democracy Canon 
cannot be justified as a means of enforcing an underenforced constitutional norm, 
on “good results” grounds, or on preference-elicitation grounds.  Second, he 
claims that extension of the Democracy Canon will increase partisanship in the 
judiciary.  Third, he claims that the use of the Canon in federal courts will lead to 
“far-fetched” interpretations of federal election statutes.  I save until the next part 
of this Reply a response to Professor Elmendorf’s other claim, that the federal 
court use of the Democracy Canon is likely to deter future bipartisan election 
administration legislation. 
 
Justifications for Use of the Canon.  As I explained in The Democracy 
Canon,19 the rationale for the Democracy Canon as a tool for interpreting election 
statutes is straightforward.  The Canon’s stated purposes usually are described in 
terms of its role in fostering democracy.  Its purpose is “to give effect to the will 
of the majority and to prevent the disfranchisement of legal voters.”20 It plays a 
role in “favoring free and competitive elections.”21  It recognizes that the right to 
vote “is a part of the very warp and woof of the American ideal and is a right 
protected by both the constitutions of the United States and of the state.”22  
Liberal construction of election laws serves “to allow the greatest scope for public 
participation in the electoral process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to 
allow parties to put their candidate on the ballot, and most importantly to allow 
voters a choice on Election Day.”23 
These lofty ideals as expressed by numerous state courts across 
generations resonate in the U.S. Constitution’s protection of the ideal of voter 
equality. Although that ideal has been expressed by the United States Supreme 
Court in many cases, such as those recognizing the unconstitutionality of poll 
                                                                                                    
19 Hasen, supra note 1, at 77. 
20 Montgomery v. Henry, 39 So. 507, 508 (1905). 
21 State ex rel. White v. Franklin Cty. Bd. Of Elections, 598 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ohio 1992). 
22 State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 80 N.E.2d 899 (Ohio. 1948). 
23 Catania v. Haberle, 588 A.2d 374, 379 (N.J. 1991). 
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taxes24 and the requirement of districts of equal population,25 it is a norm that has 
been underenforced by the courts, most recently in Bush v. Gore26 and Crawford 
v. Marion County Elections Board.27  Simply put, the courts have not enforced 
any constitutional right to vote as broad as the rhetoric about constitutional values 
in the Supreme Court’s cases. The Democracy Canon therefore can enforce these 
underenforced constitutional norms through statutory interpretation.28  Even if the 
Supreme Court has not always strongly accepted the norms behind the canon, 
they have both popular support as well as support in state courts and state 
legislatures.  The Supreme Court has no monopoly on determining which 
constitutional values it chooses not to fully enforce may be enforced more 
strongly by other judicial, legislative, and executive actors.   
Professor Elmendorf’s attack on this underenforcement argument is 
curious.  He calls this rationale “tenuous”29 and “wonders whether the true reason 
that Hasen favors the Democracy Canon is because he personally subscribes to 
the values the Canon embodies.”30 Professor Elmendorf has drawn a false 
dichotomy: the reason I put forward the underenforcement argument is because I 
believe the constitutional values which are underenforced deserve greater 
enforcement.  This is no different from a scholar who favors the rule of lenity as a 
tool of statutory interpretation out of a belief that prosecutors have too much 
discretion in choosing criminals to prosecute,31 or who favors use of the 
avoidance canon because it allows the Supreme Court to advance a more liberal 
understanding of constitutional rights at a time when conventional politics has 
become suspicious of expanded rights for disfavored groups and individuals.32  In 
short, the underenforcement and “good results” arguments overlap. 
Professor Elmendorf further argues that the Democracy Canon is 
unnecessary because there is no underenforcement of the constitutional right to 
vote. He claims that the Supreme Court has taken a “big step” toward full 
enforcement of constitutional voting rights in its recent Crawford case.33  This 
argument is unconvincing.  As Professor Elmendorf himself has noted 
                                                                                                    
24 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
25 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
26 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
27 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008). 
28 Hasen, supra note 1, at 98-100. 
29 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [5]. 
30 Id.   
31 Philip p. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1 
J. LEGIS & PUB. POL’Y 105, 129 (1997). 
32 Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process 
Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 397 
(2005). 
33 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [18]. 
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elsewhere,34 Crawford contains no majority opinion and it provides no solid 
guidance for lower courts to adjudicate constitutional challenges to garden-variety 
election laws.  Indeed, Professor Elmendorf identifies five separate ways that a 
lower court might interpret the rule of Crawford, including some variations under 
which plaintiffs have virtually no chance of succeeding in vindicating their 
constitutional claims.35  While there is some uncertainty as to the future use of 
Crawford by lower courts and the Supreme Court, the opinion (which does not 
even reference Bush v. Gore’s aspirational statement about the unconstitutionality 
of valuing one person’s vote over that of another36) hardly eliminates two 
centuries of court constitutional underenforcement of voting rights.  To the 
contrary, Crawford is a brand new decision from a conservative Supreme Court 
which generally does not seem intent on expanding voting rights;37 Professor 
Elmendorf points to no evidence showing lower courts relying upon the case to 
expand the constitutional rights of voters.38 
Professor Elmendorf also claims that defending the Democracy Canon on 
“good results” grounds is problematic, because there will always be tradeoffs 
among competing values in election law cases, and there is no reason to favor the 
enfranchisement of voters over other values, such as reducing the fiscal costs of 
election administration.39  To begin with, often there will not need to be a tradeoff 
among competing values.  Consider again a court’s decision under the Democracy 
Canon to allow a “check mark” rather than a statutorily-commanded “x” to count 
as a valid vote.  It is hard to imagine important competing values on the other side 
of such a decision, at least so long as the courts have been applying a long-
standing rule to use the Canon in appropriate cases.40  In additions, courts or 
legislatures often have shown themselves willing make the tradeoff among 
                                                                                                    
34 Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the Constitutional 
Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
507 (2008). 
35 Id. at 536-37. 
36 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104-05 (“Having one granted the right to vote on equal terms, the 
State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of 
another.”). 
37 Hasen, supra note 1, at 99-100. 
38 On the practical difficulties of courts doing so, see Julien Kern, “As-Applied” Constitutional 
Challenges, Class Actions, and Other Strategies: Potential Solutions to Challenging Voter 
Identification Laws after Crawford, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629 (2009). 
39 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [22].  He lists eight “likely” “shared values” which might need 
to be traded off against the Democracy Canon. 
40 As I explain in Part IV of The Democracy Canon, serious due process concerns may arise when 
a court uses the Democracy Canon for the first time in a disputed election, thereby changing the 
rules of the game as they existed on election day.  For more on this “lawlessness” principle, see 
Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Lawlessness Principle: A Comment on Professor Amar, 
61 FLA. L. REV. 979 (2009). 
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competing values by adopting the Democracy Canon as a default rule.  When a 
legislature enacts the Democracy Canon through a statutory rule of 
interpretation,41 it represents a democratically-enacted decision to favor the 
interests of voters’ enfranchisement over other competing interests in election 
administration.  When courts adopt the Canon as a common law principle, they 
adopt a default rule likely favored by voters behind a veil of ignorance, a rule 
which nonetheless is subject to legislative override by the democratically-elected 
legislature. The Democracy Canon does not privilege the interest of voter 
enfranchisement over all interests in every case; but it does provide a starting 
point for discussion, with appropriate weight given to a major value in democratic 
society, voter enfranchisement.42 
Professor Elmendorf also takes issue with my other argument for the 
Democracy Canon, that it will be “preference-eliciting.”43  Under the preference 
elicitation argument, if a legislature wishes to pass an election law that would not 
be subject to the Democracy Canon, and would be read strictly so as not to 
maximize voter enfranchisement, it can pass a law to overcome a default judicial 
application of the Democracy Canon.44   In other words, judicial adoption of the 
Democracy Canon will spur the Legislature to override it in appropriate cases. 
Professor Elmendorf is skeptical that courts will be able to quickly and 
reliably respond to judicial applications of the Democracy Canon.45  Here, 
Professor Elmendorf misunderstands the nature of the court-legislature 
interaction. As I repeatedly explained in my Article,46 the Legislature may act ex 
ante in exempting certain election laws from the Democracy Canon when the 
legislature desires to do so.  For example, generally speaking, both the Colorado 
Supreme Court and the Colorado Legislature have embraced the Democracy 
                                                                                                    
41 Hasen, supra note 1, at 49 n.79. 
42 Courts wisely have avoided applying the Democracy Canon in cases in which serious 
allegations of fraud have arisen.  In such cases, the danger of lenient interpretation of election 
laws is that it could facilitate fraudulent activity.  In the absence of such concerns, however, there 
is nothing wrong with privileging voters’ rights over other concerns, such as the costs of election 
administration.   
 Professor Elmendorf worries that the fraud exception to the Democracy Canon’s 
application could eviscerate the rule, because it is hard to know when fraud exists and allegations 
of fraud are quite common.  Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [23 n.80].  Though it may be true 
that allegations of fraud are quite common after a close election, courts are usually quite adept at 
dismissing frivolous claims of fraud when made in election contests. 
43 See Hasen, supra note 1, at 100-03 (setting forth preference elicitation argument). 
44 See id.  
45 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ n. 72 [20].  He says that legislatures may do so when there is 
unified government control and the decision works against the governing party’s interests or when 
the decision disadvantages incumbents of all stripes. 
46 See Hasen, supra note 1, at 106, 122. 
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Canon.47  But the Colorado legislature wrote a statute dealing with filling 
vacancies before an election to provide in unmistakable terms that vacancies shall 
not be filled when a vacancy occurs within eighteen days of the general election.48 
By doing so, the Colorado legislature overrode the default Democracy Canon in a 
particular instance where other interests (such as the interest in efficient 
administration and prevention of voter confusion in the weeks before the election) 
trump voters’ rights to vote in a truly competitive election. 
The Colorado example shows that it does not take legislative 
omniscience49 for a legislature in a Democracy Canon jurisdiction to realize it 
needs to use clear, firm language if it wants courts not to apply the Canon.  Of 
course, many legislatures appear to like application of the Democracy Canon, 
which is why so many Legislatures have codified it, and perhaps why legislatures 
such as the New Jersey legislature have not changed their laws in response to 
aggressive judicial application of the Canon.50 
 
 The Democracy Canon and Judicial Partisanship.  Professor Elmendorf 
notes the “access versus integrity” debate between Democrats and Republicans, in 
which Democrats favor rules (such as election day registration) that are meant to 
increase the number of eligible voters and Republicans favor rules that are meant 
                                                                                                    
47 See id. at 86 n.78 (quoting Colorado Supreme Court decision extending Democracy Canon to 
absentee ballot legislation); id. at 79 n.49 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. §1-1-103(1) (2008) (“This 
code shall be liberally construed so that all eligible voters may be permitted to vote and those who 
are not eligible electors may be kept from voting in order to prevent fraud and corruption in 
elections”)). 
48 See id. at 108 & n.198 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-4-1002(2.5)(A) (WEST 2002)). 
49 Cf. Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [11] (“But in point of fact, legislators are not omniscient 
and they draft statutes under terrific time pressures…”).  In addition, as Professor Elmendorf 
concedes, id. at ___ [15], there is no reason to believe that “agenda-displacement costs”—i.e., the 
costs to the legislature to override judicial errors in statutory interpretation—are greater with the 
Democracy Canon than any other principle of statutory interpretation. 
50 See Hasen, supra note 1, at 110 (“Indeed, despite criticism of the Samson opinion, the New 
Jersey Legislature has not amended its vacancy statute to impose clearer language.”).  Professor 
Elmendorf dismisses the partisan unity in Samson on grounds that the case involved replacing a 
candidate due to a late vacancy, and not an issue of vote counting.  Elmendorf, supra note 9, at 
___ [11].  But Samson arose in a highly-charged political atmosphere in which Republicans 
accused the state Supreme Court of acting in an absurd an unjustified way.  Hasen, supra note 1, 
at 108-09. 
Professor Elmendorf also suggests that the fact that legislatures do not overrule court 
application of the Democracy Canon “does not establish that the Canon has any substantive 
benefits.”  Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [20].  True, but the fact that many legislatures codify 
the Canon demonstrates that at least some legislatures see the benefits of the Canon as a default 
rule, and likely at least some other legislatures do not bother codifying the Canon, even though 
they like it, because it is an already-established judicial rule. 
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to deter election fraud (such as voter identification requirements).51  He then 
claims that the Democracy Canon takes sides in this debate, by favoring the 
Democrats:52 “In an era in which the two major political parties are locked in 
combat over the extent to which barriers to voter participation or opportunities for 
voter fraud represent the greater threat to democracy, a tool of statutory 
interpretation that amounts to a thumb on the scale, of indeterminate magnitude, 
in favor of voter participation, seems likely to increase both the ‘partisan gap’ in 
judicial decision-making and the media drumbeat concerning judicial partisanship 
in election cases.”53 
 Professor Elmendorf’s claim is belied by the evidence of the application of 
the Democracy Canon in state courts.  Consider the controversial Samson 
opinion,54 described in Part III of my Article. In that case, application of the 
Democracy Canon favored Democrats, and the unanimous opinion was joined by 
all the court’s justices, including four Democrats, two Republicans, and an 
independent.55  Or consider the pair of 2008 Ohio election law cases that I 
describe in the introduction of my Article.56  In both cases, a unanimous Ohio 
Supreme Court (made up entirely of Republican judges) relied upon the 
Democracy Canon in ruling on two election challenges: one ruling favored 
Democrats and the other favored Republicans.57  If courts are dividing along 
partisan lines over application of the Democracy Canon, I have not seen it. 
 The reason that there is not a Democratic valence to the Democracy 
Canon is no mystery: there is no a priori reason to believe that Democrats are 
more likely than Republicans to want to rely upon the Canon.  Republicans are 
just as likely to face a last-minute vacancy to be filled before an election as 
Democrats,58 and a Republican is just as likely to be on the wrong side of a razor-
thin election as a Democrat and wish to invoke the Democracy Canon. 
                                                                                                    
51 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___, ___ [6, 11]. I have written extensively about this emerging 
divide in Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
52 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at __ [5-6] (“The Democracy Canon privileges a couple of these 
values to the exclusion of others, and it does so in a manner that risks at least the appearance of 
judicial partiality toward one of the two major political parties (the Democrats).”). 
53 Id. at ___ [10]. 
54 N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028 (N.J. 2002). 
55 Hasen, supra note 1, at 107.  So much for Professor Elmendorf’s statement that “it would be 
quite surprising if Democratic and Republican judges were able to converge on shared 
understandings about when the Canon is properly triggered.”  Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [9]. 
56 Hasen, supra note 1, at 70-71 (describing State ex rel. Colvin v. Brunner, 896 N.E.2d 979 (Ohio 
2008) and Myles v. Bruner, 899 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio 2008)). 
57 See id. at 79-80. 
58 Consider the recent questionable case in which the Fifth Circuit held that Texas law, read in 
light of the Constitution’s qualifications clause, barred Republicans from replacing Congressman 
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 In the latter category consider the Coleman-Franken dispute in Minnesota.  
There, Republican Norm Coleman, slightly behind Democrat Al Franken after a 
manual recount in the 2008 U.S. Senate race in the state, relied upon the 
Democracy Canon in arguing that the state must count non-complying absentee 
ballots.59  Though it was somewhat entertaining to election law aficionados to 
hear Coleman’s Republican lawyers raising “access” arguments and Franken’s 
Democratic lawyers raising “integrity” arguments, the truth of the matter is that in 
a close election a candidate’s lawyer raises whatever argument may help her 
client win the election contest, even if it does not line up with the party’s official 
ideology. 
 In my Article, I recognized that there is a danger that judges could 
selectively use (or appear to use) the Democracy Canon to reach a particular 
political outcome.60  But that is not a risk that applies to only Democratic judges.  
It exists whenever a canon of construction leaves some play in the joints for 
statutory interpretation.  I hope that my original Article explained why the risk is 
worth the candle, and how consistent court application of the Democracy Canon, 
coupled with ex ante legislative override of the default Canon in appropriate 
circumstances, can minimize this danger of politicization of the Canon.  Indeed, 
when courts consistently apply the Canon, it can minimize political tension by 
showing that voters of all stripes get the same benefit of the Canon: sometimes it 
will help Democratic interests, sometimes Republican interests, and sometimes 
the interests of others.  At its core is protection of voter enfranchisement rights.  If 
in the end that concept lines up more with the rhetoric of Democrats rather than 
Republicans, it does not seem to affect court application of the Canon. 
 
 The Democracy Canon and Far-Fetched Interpretations of Federal 
Statutes.  Professor Elmendorf argues against the extension of the Democracy 
Canon to federal courts because the Canon “could provide a varnish of legality 
                                                                                                                                     
Tom DeLay on the ballot in 2006.  Texas Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582 (5th Cir. 
2006). 
59 Though Minnesota had a tradition of generally applying the Democracy Canon in election law 
disputes, it remained in the minority of states refusing to apply the Canon to issues related to 
absentee ballots.  See Hasen, supra note 1, at 86.  In the Coleman-Franken dispute, the state 
supreme court relied upon this history in rejecting Coleman’s argument for use of the Democracy 
Canon in this dispute, stating that the proper treatment of ballots deviating from statutory absentee 
ballot requirements “is a policy determination for the legislature, not this court, to make.”  In re 
Contest of Gen. Election Held on Nov. 4, 2008, for the Purpose of Electing a U.S. Senator from 
Minn., 787 N.W.2d 453, 462 n.11 (Minn. 2009).    Had the state Supreme Court ruled otherwise 
for Coleman, by adopting the Democracy Canon for the first time for absentee ballots in the 
course of resolving a disputed election, it could have raised due process concerns.  See Hasen, 
supra note 1, at 118-22. 
60 See id. at 119. 
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for far-fetched interpretations of the federal election statutes.”61  The claim is 
unsupported. Most applications of the Democracy Canon are entirely routine, 
such as the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent unanimous ruling that Ohio election 
officials should accept absentee ballot applications prepared by the McCain 
campaign even if voters did not check a box affirming citizenship inadvertently 
placed on the form by the McCain campaign and not required by state law.62  Far-
fetched?  What about an order to count hand-marked ballots when the voters did 
not draw their lines perfectly straight as required by state law,63 or a requirement 
to count ballots marked by voters with the names of the candidates’ political 
parties, despite a statutory prohibition on counting ballots containing any “mark” 
or other information?64  These cases are well within the judicial mainstream of 
statutory interpretation.  None of the cases show judges engaging in far-fetched, 
implausible interpretations. 
 The only example Professor Elmendorf gives of a potential far-fetched 
interpretation of federal election law involves suggestions that “left-leaning” 
judges could read the Help America Vote Act in ways that would contradict the 
intentions of Congress.65  Yet he points to no statutory language under HAVA 
that could allow courts applying the Canon fairly to reach these contorted results. 
Nor does he point to any state cases applying the Canon in similar circumstances.  
Indeed, of the three most controversial cases applying the Democracy Canon that 
I discuss in my Article,66 Professor Elmendorf says nothing about two of them, 
and agrees with the result in the third, the New Jersey Samson case.67   
In short, a spate of “far-fetched” interpretations of federal election statutes 
by (presumably Democratically-appointed) federal judges applying the 
Democracy Canon seems unlikely to materialize.  The same arguments which 
have sustained the Democracy Canon in state courts for at least 125 years apply in 
favor of the Canon’s extension to federal courts. 
 
                                                                                                    
61 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [4]. 
62 Myles v. Bruner, 899 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio 2008). 
63 Fallon v. Dwyer, 90 N.E. 942 (N.Y. 1910). 
64 State ex rel. Law v. Saxon, 12 So. 218, 224-25 (Fla. 1892). 
65 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [13]. 
66 N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028 (N.J. 2002) (discussed in Hasen, supra 
note 1, at 106-10); Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 2000) 
(discussed in Hasen, supra note 1, at 114-18); and Roe v. Mobile County Appointment Bd., 676 
So.2d 1206 (Ala. 1995) (discussed in Hasen, supra note 1, at 118-22). 
67 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [39-40]. 
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A FEDERAL DEMOCRACY CANON AND ITS LIKELY EFFECT 
ON FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 
 
Apart from arguments about the potential negative effects of the 
Democracy Canon’s application on the courts, Professor Elmendorf argues that 
the Canon’s extension to federal courts will deter Congress from passing future 
bipartisan election administration legislation.  In this Part, I explain why this 
latter concern is unwarranted. 
Professor Elmendorf’s argument builds upon the work of Professors Dan 
Rodriguez and Barry Weingast.68 Roughly speaking, they argue that the passage 
of legislation requires legislative leaders to secure the votes of “pivotal 
legislators” who could vote for or against the bill.  To secure these votes, leaders 
need to make credible statements to the pivotal legislators about ambiguous 
language or gaps in the proposed legislation. After the legislation passes, courts 
are called upon to interpret this ambiguous language or to fill in gaps in the 
legislation.  Professors Rodriguez and Weingast advocate that courts “enforce the 
legislative deal” by interpreting the statute in line with the preferences of the 
“pivotal legislators.” When courts instead adopt an “expansionist” view of 
ambiguous language, as the authors claim the Supreme Court did in reading 
portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they make it less likely that pivotal 
legislators will pass future legislation.  In other words, if pivotal legislators know 
that the courts will not enforce legislative deals, and will instead interpret the 
statute in a way consistent with the views of its most ardent supporters, they will 
be less likely to enter into future deals. 
Professor Elmendorf’s extension of these ideas to the election 
administration arena is straightforward. Republicans will not sign on to bipartisan 
legislative deals on election administration without a “belief that courts would 
enforce the gist of the deal.  If Republican Senators and Representative knew that 
there was a special ‘pro voter’ canon of interpretation [that] could be trolled out 
by liberal judges to construe the inevitable imperfections of legislative drafting in 
a manner that undermines the legislative deal, they would fight tooth and nail 
against bills that even modestly liberalize the terms of voter participation…”69 
I am quite dubious of the general Rodriguez/Weingast positive claim that 
expansionist interpretations of statutes by the judiciary decrease the volume of 
legislation passed by Congress. To me it is just as plausible that pivotal legislators 
will simply demand clearer language in order to secure their votes, assuming they 
                                                                                                    
68 Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory 
Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207 (2007). 
69 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [13-14]. 
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even pay attention at all to the scope of judicial interpretations of statutes.  I hope 
to write more about my skepticism elsewhere, but for the sake of argument in this 
Reply, I will accept the Rodriguez/Weingast general claim. 
Even given the correctness of the Rodriguez/Weingast claim, I do not 
believe application of the Democracy Canon in federal courts to federal election 
statutes would deter Congress from passing future bipartisan election 
administration legislation.  As explained in Part I of this Reply, Republicans are 
just as likely as Democrats to benefit from application of the Democracy Canon in 
election administration court cases.  Indeed, just a few months ago, Congress 
passed the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act,70 which expands the 
rights of military and other overseas voters to cast a vote that will be counted in 
federal elections.  Conventional wisdom is that military votes skew Republican, 
and so application of the Democracy Canon to this statute could help, rather than 
hinder, Republican self-interest.   
Moreover, if Republicans were so averse to voter enfranchisement claims, 
it is unclear why they would have voted for a “Sense of Congress” resolution in 
the 2001 amendment to UOCAVA stating that “all eligible American voters, 
regardless of race, ethnicity, disability, the language they speak, or the resources 
of the community in which they live, should have an equal opportunity to cast a 
vote and to have that vote counted.”71  A Republican majority worried about 
“liberal judges” deciding election administration cases with a “pro-voter” bias 
certainly would not have given such judges a hook to upon which to hang such a 
pro-voter interpretation. 
Finally, since 2000 it has proven to be difficult as a general matter to pass 
bipartisan election administration legislation.72  Professor Elmendorf has not 
shown that a canon of statutory interpretation that might apply to certain disputes 
                                                                                                    
70 P.L. 111-84, §§ 575-89, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/21814319/Military-and-
Overseas-Voter-Empowerment-Act. 
71 Pub. L. No. 107-107, div. A, titl. XVI, § 1601, 115 Stat. 1274 (2001).  The language was 
approved as part of a broader defense appropriations bill.  When that appropriations bill was 
considered in the Senate, Republican Senator Allard initially proposed an amendment expressing 
a sense of the Senate about the importance of protecting the voting rights of uniformed voters.  
See S.Amend.1755 to S.1438, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:SP01755:. The 
amendment did not include the language quoted in the text above.  Instead, the quoted language 
was added by a bipartisan House-Senate conference, H. Rpt. 107-333, § 1601, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp107:FLD010:@1%28hr333%29:. Republicans in the 
House voted for the final bill including the quoted language by a vote of 174 in favor to 34 
opposed.  All Republican Senators but one (Senator McCain) voted for the final bill, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&sessi
on=1&vote=00369.  One Republican Senator did not vote. 
72 See Hasen, supra note 51. 
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involving some aspects of election legislation is likely to have anything more than 
a negligible effect on the chances of future election legislation passing. 
 
III. 
JUDICIAL DECISION RULES IN ELECTION CASES  
AND THE BENEFITS OF SIMPLICITY 
 
In addition to Professor Elmendorf’s many arguments against the 
Democracy Canon, he uses more than half of his response to offer three 
alternative canons of interpretation in statutory election law cases which he 
claims are “more normatively defensible and less politically treacherous” than the 
Democracy Canon.73 He spends a full-third of his Response, [16] pages, on one of 
the three canons, the Effective Accountability Canon (“the EA Canon”).74  My 
purpose in this Part is to show that the EA Canon is less normatively defensible 
and more politically treacherous than the Democracy Canon. 
 Consider some of the great benefits of the Democracy Canon already 
explored.  It is simple and easily understood: courts should interpret unclear 
statutes to favor the voters.  Judges and lay people can understand a rule that says 
that someone who cannot draw a straight line in filling in a ballot should still have 
her vote counted despite a law providing for ballots to be marked with two 
straight lines.  The Canon has been applied consistently by many state courts by 
judges of all ideological persuasions for 125 years. The Canon reinforces a 
popular underenforced constitutional norm to favor the enfranchisement of voters 
and their chance to vote in competitive elections.  The Canon, once established, 
can provide a baseline for judges of various ideologies to apply to election 
statutes.  Legislatures that do not want voter-enfranchising interpretations of 
statutes in particular cases can draft around the default rule.  The Canon is 
unlikely to lead to far-fetched interpretation of election statutes. 
Now consider the EA Canon.  It is hard for me to briefly describe the EA 
Canon; indeed, I had to read Professor Elmendorf’s description numerous times 
before I could understand it.75 It appears that Professor Elmendorf advocates use 
                                                                                                    
73 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [4]. 
74 His “Carrington canon” would call upon courts to construe statutes narrowly that were passed 
on a party line vote.  Id. at ___ [6-7]. I have expressed my skepticism of statutory interpretation 
based upon improper partisan motive in Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 843.  His “Neutrality canon,” which he spends the least time explaining, would have courts 
“interpret election codes with an eye to reducing the fact or appearance of judicial partisanship.”  
Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [7]. 
75 Here is Professor Elmendorf’s introductory paragraph explaining the concept: 
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of the EA Canon to interpret ambiguous statutes to (1) insure that the voting 
public is representative of the group of people entitled to vote; (2) improve the 
aggregate competence of the voting public to make decisions about which 
candidates retrospectively and prospectively act in the voters’ interest; and (3) 
facilitate coordination among like-minded voters. 
The vices of such a canon of interpretation are many.  First, the canon is 
complex and abstract.  How are courts to know what improves “aggregate 
competence of the voting public”?  How is a court to implement a “presumptive 
preference for the regime under which the demographics of the persons who vote 
better mirror those of the entire normative electorate?”76  Apparently, in making 
these judicial determinations, courts “would have to wade through and adjudicate 
disputes among political scientists about the actual or likely effects of alternative 
institutional arrangements.”77 Professor Elmendorf assures us that if courts get 
these wrong, it is no matter, as “judicial mistakes would be subject to correction 
by the legislature or an implementing agency.”78  He does not explain why the 
“agenda displacement” and other costs he associated with legislative override of 
the Democracy Canon would not apply at least as strongly with respect to judicial 
determinations under the EA Canon.   
Make no mistake: the EA Canon would be difficult to apply, and the 
outcome of challenges brought in reliance on the EA Canon difficult to predict. 
Not every court applying the statute will be stacked with former law professors 
                                                                                                                                     
The very idea of democracy presupposes a normative electorate to which public officials 
are ultimately accountable.  Although the normative electorate must be defined in a 
manner that gives it a fair claim to speaking for the citizenry as a whole, reasonable 
people may disagree about the propriety of one or another voter qualification (consider 
the status of felons).  There is also ample room for debate about what offices should be 
elective, the frequency of elections, the separation or consolidation of governmental 
powers, the scope for directly democratic lawmaking, the constitutional entrenchment of 
preferred rights, and more. Bracketing these large normative questions, however, we can 
say that the electoral component of a political order is more or less effective vis-à-vis the 
objective of polar accountability depending on (1) the degree to which the persons who 
turn out to vote are representative of the normative electorate as a whole; (2) the 
aggregate competence of the voting public in apportion blame retrospectively, and, 
arguably, in identifying those candidate who are most likely to act as the voters—if fully 
informed—would wish for them to act; and (3) the extent to which the electoral system 
facilitates or retards effective coordination among like-minded voters. 
 
Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [24] (footnotes omitted and original emphasis). 
76 Id.  Or consider this constitutional principle Elmendorf advocates: “An election law…is 
unconstitutional if there are practicable alternatives that would result in substantially more 
effective accountability to the normative electorate as a reasonable cost.” Id. at ___ [25]. 
77 Id. at ___ [39]. 
78 Id. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1532424




trained in abstract legal theory, and there is no guarantee that theoreticians would 
do an especially good job interpreting election statutes.  This is especially true 
because the rule is inchoate, to be filled with the ideological preferences of the 
judges applying it. The EA Canon emerges not from court experience interpreting 
statutes, but from Professor Elmendorf’s head, and his (admittedly controversial) 
reading of the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution.79  Indeed, Professor 
Elmendorf concedes that the EA Canon has not been adopted by any court, and it 
has been rejected repeatedly by the Supreme Court in its constitutional variant.80   
Despite the fact that the EA Canon has no tradition or pedigree, and it not 
easily understood, its application apparently could be very far-reaching, much 
further reaching than the Democracy Canon.  Professor Elmendorf claims that in 
its constitutional manifestation the Effective Accountability norm could “be used 
to attack the timing of elections; the drawing of electoral districts, the existence of 
nonpartisan elections; the choice between districted and at-large elections; the 
provisions (or lack therefore) of information to voters on the ballot, in ballot 
pamphlets, or in pre-election mailings; ballot design; state policies that bear on 
the privacy or publicity of voting behavior; the variety and extent of campaign 
finance restrictions; the location of voting precincts and the provision (or lack 
thereof) for county-level ‘vote centers’; the permissibility of national parties 
fielding candidates for local office; and perhaps even the issue of ‘full electorate’ 
elections…”81 Its statutory analogue, the EA Canon, could be used to further 
these same goals through interpretation of ambiguous election statutes.  Though 
Professor Elmendorf seems to believe that courts applying EA norms in statutory 
cases will be more restrained than if those who would apply these norms in 
constitutional cases, I do not share his confidence. 
Despite this breathtaking breadth of the EA Canon, which would be a 
great expansion of judicial power in the pursuit of structural interests (and not 
voting rights),82 there is no reason to believe that courts applying the EA Canon 
would be seen by the public as reaching more legitimate decisions than courts 
applying the Democracy Canon.  Professor Elmendorf tells us that the 
                                                                                                    
79 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___[28] (admitting the lack of clarity about the meaning and 
enforceability of the Guarantee Clause, but arguing that his analysis “does yield a picture of the 
Clause’s meaning that in some respects is clear enough for judicial enforcement through tools of 
statutory construction.”) (original emphasis). 
80 Id. at ___ [34-35]. 
81 Id. at ___ [36-38] (footnotes omitted). 
82 See, e.g., id. at ___ [40] (“From an accountability perspective, who wins a razor-thin election is 
unimportant; the leading vote-getters have proven themselves more or less equally satisfactory to 
the voters.”).  For my take on the rights-structure debate, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE ch. 5 
(2003).  
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controversial Samson case would come out the same way under the EA Canon83 
as it did under the Democracy Canon, but he also tells us that the public pays 
attention to judicial results, not reasoning.84  If application of the Democracy 
Canon in Samson could undermine public confidence in the judiciary, why would 
the EA Canon not do the same? 
Finally, Professor Elmendorf cavalierly predicts (without providing any 
evidence) that there would be less judicial partisanship under the EA Canon, as 
there are aspects of it that should appeal to Democratic judges and aspects that 
appeal to Republican judges.85 This statement appears to be based upon little 
more than wishful thinking; in contrast, we have a long tradition of bipartisan 
judicial application of the Democracy Canon. 
In sum, the EA Canon has fewer normative benefits than the Democracy 
Canon and many potential drawbacks.  It maximizes judicial power in the name 
of promoting certain structural values, without regard to safeguarding individual 
voting rights.  The EA Canon’s complexity and uncertainty in application 
increases the chances the canon could be manipulated for partisan reasons or 





Professor Elmendorf finds much to criticize in the Democracy Canon, and 
argues against its extension to federal courts, despite the Canon’s long pedigree 
and consistent application by judges of various parties and ideologies in state 
courts.  As I have shown here, Professor Elmendorf unduly downplays the 
Canon’s benefits and exaggerates the risks attendant with the Canon’s 
application.  My appreciation for the Democracy Canon has only increased when 
I compare the Canon to Professor Elmendorf’s alternative EA Canon.  
Empowering courts with something like an EA Canon would be dangerous for the 
judiciary, by injecting courts further into the political thicket without clear 
guidance or purpose. In this instance, simplicity and tradition in election 
adjudication trump novelty and complexity. 
 
                                                                                                    
83 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at ___ [39-40]. 
84 Id. at ___[10]. 
85 Id. at ___[40] (finding “some basis for hoping that an equilibrium would emerge in which 
liberal and conservative judges honor one another’s concerns in cases that implicate the canon”). 
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